Cleveland Clinic Florida Hospital v. Lamkin, 987 So.2d
814 (Fla. 2008)
This case originated as a medical malpractice case
brought by a Hospital patient who sustained injuries to her hand as a result
of a negligently administered IV by an agency nurse. The defendants sued in
this action–the Hospital (represented by the firm), the nurse, and the
agency which employed the nurse–settled with plaintiff and the Hospital
sought to recoup its settlement monies from the negligent nurse and the
agency that employed her on theories of common law and contractual
indemnity. The trial court partially granted summary judgment in favor of
the nurse and the staffing agency finding that the Hospital was not entitled
to recoup the monies it paid to settle the action.
On appeal, the Hospital argued that actual wrongdoing
or lack thereof determines indemnity rights, not what claims were pled
against the Hospital by the plaintiff. And, because there was conflicting
evidence on this point and the record contained evidence that the Hospital
bore no fault for plaintiff’s injuries, summary judgment was improper. In a
per curiam decision, the Fourth District agreed with the Hospital,
reversing the summary judgment on the common law and contractual indemnity
claims.
Essex Insurance Company v. Zota, 985 So.2d 1036 (Fla.
2008).
The Florida Supreme Court ruled in favor of the firm's
client in this case which worked its way to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit which then certified five questions of
great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court. The supreme court’s
thirty-page unanimous decision marked a significant victory on insurance
issues critical to the surplus-lines insurance industry in Florida. The
Supreme Court held, consistent with long-standing precedent, that
surplus-lines insurers are not required to deliver their policies directly
to the insured but may do so through the insured’s independent
representative-broker.
Awadallah v. Singer,
950 So. 2d 1250 (Table) (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
This appeal arises out
of the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of our
client, Defendants, Jay R. Singer, D.D.S, and his professional
association, Jay R. Singer, D.D.S., P.A. based on the lack of record proof of
causation between Plaintiff’s alleged injuries and any alleged breach of duty of
care on the part of Dr. Singer.
On appeal, Plaintiff contended that the expert affidavits she presented for the
first time on rehearing should have been considered by the trial court. She
also claimed that the trial court should have continued the summary judgment
hearing even though she did not file any written motion for continuance and
conducted no discovery between the filing of the motion for summary judgment and
the hearing on it which took place four months later. The Fourth Distinct
rejected Plaintiff's arguments and issued a per curiam affirmance of the trial
court's summary final judgment.
Lee v. Simon, 885 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2004).
In this
medical malpractice case which examined when the medical malpractice statute of
limitations begins to run, the appellate court agreed a defendant doctor was
entitled to summary judgment because the statute of limitations began to run
when the decedent died, even though the estate’s representative failed to
discover the exact identity of the doctor who gave the order to admit the
decedent to the hospital. To be more precise, the plaintiff’s attorneys assumed
that the reference to a Dr. Simon in the medical records referred to a Dr. Fred
Simon when in fact it referred to a Dr. David Simon who was never served with a
notice of intent.
Mexiport, Inc. v. Frontier Communications Services, Inc., 253 F.3d 573 (11th
Cir. 2001).
In
affirming a summary judgment entered in favor of a telecommunications company,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the filing of an informal complaint with the
Federal Communications Commission precludes the same person from bringing an
action in a federal district court based on the same claim.
R/S Associates of Florida v. Bellsouth Mobility, Inc.,
778 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
In
dismissing this appeal, the appellate court held that an order granting summary
judgment of one count of a complaint, where other counts against the same
parties are pending, is not authorized when the dismissed count is interrelated
with the remaining counts.
Valdes v. Miami Herald Publishing Co.,
782 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
The
court held that because there was no evidence that newspaper vending machines at
a corner location obstructed motorists’ view of a stop sign, the newspaper
company which owned the machines was entitled to summary judgment because the
machines were not the "cause in fact" of the accident in which the motorist ran
the stop sign and struck a motorcyclist.
Saby v. J.C. Penney Life Insurance Co.,
769 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
The
appellate court affirmed a cost judgment in favor of the defendant because the
trial court’s departure from the Statewide Uniform Guidelines for Taxation of
Costs in Civil Actions was within the trial court’s discretion.